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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
approving a class action settlement of an antitrust case. 
Ironically, the lead objector, Lazy Oil Co., is also the lead 
plaintiff, whose principal, Bennie G. Landers, conceived the 
suit but later became disaffected with its management and 
direction and ultimately with its fruits--the settlement. All 
the objectors are producers of Penn Grade Crude Oil, i.e., 
crude oil drawn from the western side of the Appalachian 
Basin within the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
and West Virginia.1 The objectors contend that the 
settlement is not fair, at least to the producer plaintiffs in 
contrast to the investor plaintiffs. The objectors distinguish 
between these two types of class members in making their 
objections to the settlement, alleging that producer 
plaintiffs, as full-time oil-producing enterprises, have 
distinct interests and, particularly, unique losses, as 
compared to investor plaintiffs, who simply invest funds in 
oil-producing businesses. 
 
The objectors maintain that producer plaintiffs lost not 
only revenues from the lower prices paid for their oil (a loss 
they share with investor plaintiffs), but also suffered the 
compounded losses from their inability to invest these lost 
funds in drilling new oil wells or upgrading their existing 
ones--losses allegedly not applicable to investor plaintiffs. 
This alleged distinction is also at the heart of the other two 
issues raised by objectors in this appeal. They contend that 
the District Court erred in not certifying a subclass of 
producer plaintiffs to ensure that their unique interests 
were adequately represented. Finally, they contend that the 
Class Counsel--originally hired to bring this suit by the 
lead plaintiffs, who are now objectors--should have been 
disqualified from representing the remaining class 
representatives and the entire class once the objectors 
chose to attack the settlement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Titusville, Pennsylvania, home of objectors' counsel, is the situs of 
the 
Drake Oil Well, the first oil-producing well in the world--drilled in 
1859. 
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The District Court conducted three days of hearings 
regarding, inter alia, the objectors' claims that the 
settlement was not fair, that a subclass of producer 
plaintiffs should be certified, and that Class Counsel 
should be disqualified from representing the class. On 
December 31, 1997, the District Court filed an omnibus 
order overruling objections to the settlement, approving the 
terms of the settlement, denying objectors' motion to 
remove or disqualify Class Counsel, denying objectors' 
motion for certification of a subclass, and denying approval 
of the plan for allocating the settlement proceeds. 
 
From the objectors' point of view, our opinion should be 
devoted largely to a merits analysis of their objections to 
the settlement, measured by the standards outlined in 
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975). However, we 
dispose of that aspect of the case summarily, concluding 
that the Girsh factors are easily met and that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the 
settlement. Neither do we have difficulty with the District 
Court's order refusing to remove or disqualify Class 
Counsel, which we also affirm. We do, however, expound on 
this point to clarify the standard for adjudicating such 
claims in the class action context. More specifically, 
drawing on the concurring opinion in In re Corn Derivatives 
Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(Adams, J., concurring), we adopt a balancing approach to 
motions to remove or disqualify class counsel on conflict-of 
interest grounds once former class representatives, i.e., 
former clients of class counsel, become objectors and 
therefore adversaries to class counsel's remaining clients. 
 
One other point requires discussion--our appellate 
jurisdiction. The District Court, in its December 31, 1997, 
order from which this appeal was taken, did not dispose of 
all outstanding issues related to the settlement (i.e., it 
denied a motion to approve the allocation plan that was 
part of the settlement). Therefore, we must determine 
whether the rule of Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 
F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983), that in certain circumstances a 
premature appeal may ripen once collateral issues are 
disposed of by the district court, confers on us appellate 
jurisdiction because an allocation plan has since been 
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approved by the District Court. We decide that Cape May 
Greene is both intact and applicable, and that we therefore 
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the order of the 
District Court, which we, in all respects, affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
The subject of this appeal began as two separate class 
actions, each brought in the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, by sellers of Penn Grade crude 
against three purchasers and refiners of this crude, Quaker 
State, Pennzoil, and Witco. The plaintiffs in both actions 
alleged that the defendants conspired to depress the price 
of Penn Grade Crude, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. The cases were consolidated and, in June 1995, the 
District Court certified the consolidated case as a class 
action under Rule 23(b)(3), with the class comprising all 
"direct sellers of Penn Grade Crude" who sold oil to the 
defendants between January 1, 1981, and June 30, 1995. 
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs settled with Quaker State 
for $4.4 million. This settlement was approved by the 
District Court, and no issues relating to it are before us. 
 
In early 1997, after several months of negotiations, 
plaintiffs reached a settlement with the remaining 
defendants, under which Pennzoil would pay approximately 
$9.7 million and Witco would pay approximately $4.8 
million, with neither defendant admitting any liability or 
wrongdoing. Upon presentation of the settlement to the 
class representatives, two of them, Lazy Oil Co. and 
Thomas A. Miller Oil Co., objected to the settlement.2 At 
least 384 class members joined Lazy Oil et al. in objecting 
to the terms of the settlement after receiving notice of its 
terms.3 Class Counsel thereafter moved to withdraw from 
representing the objectors. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A third class representative, John B. Andreassi, later joined Lazy Oil 
and Thomas A. Miller in objecting to the proposed settlement. Andreassi 
informed Class Counsel of his objections shortly after the settlement 
notices had been sent to class members. 
 
3. Other groups of class members objected as well, but did not appeal 
from the District Court's orders approving the settlement or the 
allocation of the proceeds. Therefore, only the objections of the Lazy Oil 
group are before us, and it is to that group we refer when using the term 
"objectors." 
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In February 1997, the District Court directed that notice 
of the proposed settlement be sent to all class members and 
published in local and national newspapers. The objectors 
filed motions, inter alia, requesting that the Court 
disapprove the settlement, for establishment of a producer 
subclass, and for disqualification of Class Counsel. As 
noted above, the District Court conducted three days of 
evidentiary hearings in April and May 1997. On December 
31, 1997, the Court approved the settlement and denied 
the objectors' motions. With extensive findings of fact, the 
Court found that plaintiffs faced substantial obstacles to 
proving that defendants had violated the antitrust laws, as 
well as serious problems with their theory of damages. The 
Court also found that the notice to class members had been 
adequate, and that relatively few class members objected to 
the settlement. After evaluating these and the other Girsh 
factors, it concluded that the settlement was fair and 
reasonable, and that the objectors' primary concern, i.e., 
that producer plaintiffs were not adequately represented or 
compensated by the settlement, was based on a speculative 
and unsupported argument (that had been raised very late 
in the litigation). Therefore, it overruled all of the relevant 
objections and approved the settlement. This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
As noted above, we must first address the matter of our 
appellate jurisdiction, which is, of course, limited to those 
cases for which Congress has provided. In general, we may 
only hear appeals from final judgments and from certain 
prescribed interlocutory orders of the district courts. See 28 
U.S.C. SS 1291-1292; Behrens v. Pelletier , 516 U.S. 299, 
305 (1996) ("The requirement of finality precludes 
consideration of decisions that are subject to revision, and 
even of fully consummated decisions that are but steps 
towards final judgment in which they will merge." (internal 
quotations and brackets omitted)). In this case, the District 
Court filed its order approving the settlement and denying 
the objectors' motions, on December 31, 1997, but in that 
same order, denied a motion to approve an allocation plan 
for the settlement proceeds. The objectors filed a notice of 
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appeal within 30 days of this order, on January 29, 1998. 
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Following further negotiations 
pursuant to an order of the District Court, the parties 
submitted a revised allocation plan, which was approved on 
April 13, 1998, more than two months after the notice of 
appeal had been filed. Final judgment was then entered 
and the case closed. 
 
While none of the parties (plaintiffs, defendants, or 
objectors) contests our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we 
have an inherent obligation to ensure that we only decide 
those cases for which there is a proper ground for appellate 
jurisdiction. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 
F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). The question we have raised 
sua sponte and which we must answer is whether a notice 
of appeal, filed within 30 days after a district court's order 
approving a class action settlement but before the court 
enters a final judgment approving all aspects (including the 
allocation) of the settlement, ripens upon the district court's 
entry of final judgment or is premature and void. 
 
Our leading case in this area is Cape May Greene, Inc. v. 
Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983). In Cape May Greene, 
we held that a premature notice of appeal, filed after 
disposition of some of the claims before a district court, but 
before entry of final judgment, will ripen upon the court's 
disposal of the remaining claims. See id. at 184-85. In that 
case, the defendants had filed a cross-claim that was not 
actually litigated either before or after the entry of the order 
from which the appeal was taken. When the district court 
entered an order dismissing this claim--after the notice of 
appeal had been filed--we held that appellate jurisdiction 
existed, as the appellee did not allege any prejudice and "we 
had [not yet] taken any action on the merits." Id. at 184. 
We believe that exercising jurisdiction in the present case, 
in which the District Court disposed of the remaining issue 
and entered a final judgment prior to our consideration of 
the case, and in which no prejudice is alleged by any party, 
is consistent with our decision in Cape May Greene. See 
also Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir.) 
("[A] premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may 
ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has 
been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the 
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appellee suffers no prejudice."), vacated on other grounds 
sub nom. Northwest Sav. Bank v. Welch, 501 U.S. 1247 
(1991). 
 
Some courts that have followed a rule similar to ours 
have revisited this doctrine in light of the Supreme Court's 
1991 decision in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage 
Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269 (1991).4  In FirsTier, the 
Supreme Court stated that Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(2) "permits a notice of appeal from a 
nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of appeal from the 
final judgment only when a district court announces a 
decision that would be appealable if immediately followed 
by the entry of judgment." Id. at 276 (first emphasis added).5 
Therefore, Rule 4(a)(2) does not support the Cape May 
Greene doctrine when the order from which a notice of 
appeal is filed is not one that would befinal if followed 
immediately by entry of judgment.6 Relying on this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We also acknowledge that some courts refused, even before FirsTier, to 
adhere to a rule such as ours. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 795 
F.2d 35, 37-38 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing circuit split on the issue, 
rejecting Cape May Greene rule, and noting that the appellants, 
"anticipating defeat, might as well have filed the notice of appeal 
simultaneously with the filing of their counterclaims or their answer to 
the [plaintiff's] complaint"). In such cases, these courts of appeals 
dismiss the premature appeal, presumably leaving the appellant either 
without recourse to challenge the actual final order in the case or forced 
to file its notice of appeal again, if a timely one can still be filed 
after the 
appeal is dismissed. 
 
5. Rule 4(a)(2) provides that, "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court 
announces a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or 
order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry." 
 
6. When asked by us to comment on the jurisdictional issue, the parties 
argued that the order of December 31, 1997, was afinal order from 
which an appeal could be taken under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, because (they 
argued) the allocation issue was simply a separate, ministerial matter 
over which the District Court retained jurisdiction after entering a final 
order approving the settlement. See Polychrome Int'l Corp. v. Krigger, 5 
F.3d 1522, 1544 n.52 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that jurisdiction exists 
when an "order sufficiently disposes of the factual and legal issues and 
. . . any unresolved issues are sufficiently `ministerial' that there 
would 
be no likelihood of further appeal"). While we need not resolve this issue 
in light of our invocation of the rule from Cape May Greene, we question 
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distinction, the Fifth Circuit has recently abrogated its own 
version of the Cape May Greene doctrine. See United States 
v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1998) ("FirsTier 
allows premature appeals only where there has been afinal 
decision, rendered without a formal judgment."). 7 
 
We do not believe that Cape May Greene has been 
overruled by FirsTier. FirsTier simply limited the reach of 
Rule 4(a)(2)'s proviso. It did not hold that the Rule 4(a)(2) 
situation--announcement of a final decision followed by 
notice of appeal and then entry of the judgment--is the only 
situation in which a premature notice of appeal will ripen 
at a later date. In fact, Rule 4(a)(4) was amended in 1993 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
whether the District Court's order approving the settlement was a "final 
order." See In re Chicken Antitrust Litig. , 669 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 
Unit 
B 1982) ("As long as a matter such as [allocation of settlement proceeds] 
remains open, unfinished, or inconclusive, an order will not be 
considered final regardless of its characterization, and there may be no 
intrusion by appeal."); see also Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 
1346-48 & n.42 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that an "order [that] expressly 
invited `any party to submit further plans or proposals and evidence in 
support thereof' " in a desegregation case was considered nonfinal and 
nonappealable); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Joseph J. Biafore, Inc., 526 
F.2d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that an order granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, with only the computation of interest 
remaining to be done, was not a final order). 
 
The District Court, in its opinion and order, addressed the merits of 
the allocation plan and specifically refused to grant a motion to approve 
this aspect of the settlement. The plan that was eventually approved 
differed from that included in the settlement approved on December 31. 
Before this Court, the objectors in their brief specifically refer to (and 
criticize) "the allocation plan submitted by Class Counsel." Appellants' 
Br. at 30. Therefore, we question the characterization of this issue as 
simply "ministerial" and separate from the primary issues of liability and 
damages. As noted, however, we need not decide this question. 
 
7. Cooper was actually a criminal case, in which Rule 4(b), the 
counterpart to Rule 4(a)(2), was involved. Yet, the court in Cooper noted 
that the language of the two provisions is "almost identical" and should 
"be given the same meaning." 135 F.3d at 962. We have likewise read 
these provisions consistently, and found jurisdiction when a premature 
notice of appeal is filed in certain criminal cases. See United States v. 
Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899, 906 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc)." 
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to provide that a premature notice of appeal would later 
ripen if it was filed after entry of a judgment, but while 
post-trial motions were pending. Such a premature notice 
of appeal ripens upon "entry of the order disposing of the 
last such motion outstanding." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).8 
Thus, in a number of factual situations, a premature notice 
of appeal will become effective at a later date. 
 
Finally, Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure permits a court of appeals to "suspend the 
requirements or provisions" of any rule of appellate 
procedure. See Fed. R. App. P. 2. The purpose of the Rule 
is to ensure that justice is not denied on the basis of a 
mere technicality. See id. advisory committee's note ("The 
rule also contains a general authorization to the courts to 
relieve litigants of the consequences of default where 
manifest injustice would otherwise result."). For us to 
decline jurisdiction in this appeal would elevate a mere 
technicality above the important substantive issues here 
involved, as well as the right of the parties in this case to 
have their dispute resolved on its merits.9 
 
In this case, a notice of appeal was filed following final 
disposition of the key elements of the dispute: liability and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Prior to the amendment, the Rule had provided that "[a] notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the[post-trial] motions 
shall 
have no effect." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (1979). The Supreme Court had 
interpreted this provision as making such a notice of appeal a "nullity, 
. . . as if no notice of appeal were filed at all." Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982). No similar provision of 
Rule 4 currently provides an explicit command that a notice of appeal 
filed under the circumstances here "shall have no effect." To the 
contrary, we find that our rule from Cape May Greene is fully consistent 
with the principles embodied in current Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4), which 
essentially hold a premature notice of appeal in abeyance until such 
time as it would be appropriately filed and effective. 
 
9. We are, of course, mindful of the fact that the authority of Rule 2 
cannot be utilized to expand the jurisdiction of the Court. See, e.g., 
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (noting that 
Rule 2 authority does not permit "a court to`enlarge' the time limits for 
filing a notice of appeal"). Giving effect to a previously filed notice of 
appeal upon the district court's disposition of outstanding claims does 
not extend the time limits imposed on our jurisdiction. 
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the amount of damages. The appellees, both plaintiffs and 
defendants, were on notice that the objectors would be 
appealing the approval of the settlement and the denial of 
their motions by the District Court. No prejudice is claimed 
or apparent. Long before we considered any aspect of this 
case, the outstanding issue of allocation was resolved, a 
final judgment was entered, and the case was closed. 
Compare Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 
S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 54 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Arguably RTC's 
appeal, even if it was filed prematurely, ripened once the 
remaining claims in this case (the impediments tofinality) 
were settled and dismissed." (citing, inter alia, Cape May 
Greene and FirsTier)), with United States v. Davis, 924 F.2d 
501 (3d Cir. 1991) (dismissing appeal when notice of appeal 
was filed prematurely and appellants' allegations of error 
remained before the district court). Finding our precedent 
in Cape May Greene both intact and applicable to this case, 
we hold that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
 
Our scope of review of a challenge to the district court 
approval of a class action settlement is limited. We will 
reverse a settlement approval only when the district court 
has committed a "clear abuse of discretion." In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, No. 
98-819, 1999 WL 16241 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999), and cert. 
denied, No. 98-888, 1999 WL 16242 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999). 
We review a district court's decision not to certify a 
subclass for abuse of discretion. See Pennsylvania Dental 
Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 
1984). A district court's denial of a motion to disqualify 
counsel is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 765 & n.2 (3d Cir. 
1975). However, to the extent that the questions underlying 
the disqualification motion are purely legal (e.g., whether 
class counsel who represented objectors when the latter 
were class representatives can continue to represent the 
class), our review is plenary. See Kramer v. Scientific Control 
Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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IV. Settlement of the Class Action 
 
The leading case establishing the requirements for 
evaluating a class action settlement is Girsh v. Jepson, 521 
F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975). Here, the District Court 
appropriately analyzed the settlement under the nine Girsh 
factors, issuing a 113-page opinion with 74 pages of lucid 
factual findings and a thorough analysis of each aspect of 
the settlement and of the appellants' objections. Wefind the 
District Court's opinion to be persuasive and its factual 
findings to be fully supported by the record. They are 
certainly not clearly erroneous. The Court's work product 
easily meets the standard of In re General Motors Corp. Pick- 
Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 
768 (3d Cir. 1995): "In order for the determination that the 
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to survive 
appellate review, the district court must show it has 
explored comprehensively all relevant factors." Id. at 805 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 
We note specifically that the plaintiffs faced a not 
insignificant risk of losing a summary judgment motion if 
this case was not settled; of the possible exclusion of their 
damages experts following a Daubert10 hearing; and of an 
adverse verdict if the case reached trial.11 We also note that 
the settlement followed over two years of extensive 
discovery, including more than eighty depositions, 
substantial document review, and the production of expert 
reports. We agree with the District Court that the stage of 
proceedings indicates that both sides were adequately 
informed of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and 
strongly favors approval of the settlement. See Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1314 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[P]ost- 
discovery settlements are more likely to reflect the true 
value of the claim and be fair."). Given the risks of 
establishing liability and damages, the complexity of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
 
11. The objectors concede that there is no direct evidence of a price- 
fixing conspiracy, and that, therefore, they must present evidence both 
of conscious parallelism and of "plus factors" to make out a price-fixing 
case. They present only "three evidentiary artifacts" to meet the plus- 
factor requirement; all three are weak at best. 
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case, the stage of the proceedings, and the lack of 
substantial opposition to the settlement, we find no abuse 
of discretion in the District Court's approval of the 
settlement. 
 
We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court's denial of the objectors' motion for certification of a 
subclass. This issue arises from the objectors' claim that 
producer plaintiffs suffered distinct and greater damages 
than those endured by so-called investor plaintiffs. The 
District Court found that this purported distinction was 
unsupported by the facts of the case, was not relevant to 
the class claims (which were brought on behalf of"sellers," 
not producers or investors), and was raised at an extremely 
late point in the litigation. We agree. 
 
V. Disqualification of Class Counsel 
 
The objectors contend that Class Counsel should be 
disqualified because they are now representing a party (i.e., 
the plaintiffs) adverse to one they previously represented 
(i.e., the objectors), creating an impermissible conflict of 
interest. This contention raises an interesting threshold 
question as to the standard a district court should apply to 
the conflict determination. 
 
The most extensive discussion of the conflict-of-interest 
issue within our jurisprudence is found in In re Corn 
Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984). 
In Corn Derivatives, we granted a motion to disqualify an 
attorney who had formerly represented several class 
representatives; some of the class representatives approved 
of a proposed settlement and others did not. Unlike the 
present case, in Corn Derivatives counsel had withdrawn 
from representing the parties approving of the settlement 
and sought only to represent one objector on appeal. After 
consulting the relevant portions of the ABA's Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional  
Responsibility,12 we concluded that the prejudice to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Currently, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide 
that "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially 
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former clients would be too great to justify counsel's 
continued representation of the objector. See id. at 162. We 
focused on the policies underlying the rules against an 
attorney representing a party in a matter in which a former 
client is now an adversary, including preventing"even the 
potential that a former client's confidences and secrets may 
be used against him"; maintaining "public confidence in the 
integrity of the bar"; and upholding the duty of loyalty that 
a client has the right to expect. Id. 
 
Our opinion also discussed countervailing considerations, 
such as whether the counsel at issue represented the entire 
class (which was not the case in Corn Derivatives, but is 
true here), and the interest of the party who wishes to 
retain the counsel in avoiding increased costs and keeping 
"counsel who has extensive familiarity with the factual and 
legal issues involved." Id. Overall, however, we analyzed the 
situation no differently than we would have a non-class 
action case in which "two clients retained the same law firm 
to file suit, and where, later, that law firm chose to 
represent one of those clients against the other in the 
course of the same litigation." Id. at 161. 
 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Adams more explicitly 
endorsed a balancing approach to attorney-disqualification 
motions in the class action context. Judge Adams argued 
that the rules for attorney disqualification could not be 
"mechanically transpose[d]" to the class action context and 
that the more appropriate means of addressing such issues 
was through "a balancing process." Id. at 163 (Adams, J., 
concurring). After discussing the rationale behind these 
points, he noted that, "[i]f a class attorney is automatically 
prevented from continuing to represent the named parties 
or a majority of a class which supports a settlement, the 
minority dissenting class members might obtain 
considerable leverage in the litigation by being able to force 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to 
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after 
consultation." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(a) (1983); 
see also id. cmt. ("The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so 
involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly 
regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question."). 
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the majority to seek new counsel." Id. at 164 (Adams, J., 
concurring). 
 
We agree with Judge Adams's concerns. In many class 
actions, one or more class representatives will object to a 
settlement and become adverse parties to the remaining 
class representatives (and the rest of the class). If, by 
applying the usual rules on attorney-client relations, class 
counsel could easily be disqualified in these cases, not only 
would the objectors enjoy great "leverage," but many fair 
and reasonable settlements would be undermined by the 
need to find substitute counsel after months or even years 
of fruitful settlement negotiations. "Moreover, the conflict 
rules do not appear to be drafted with class action 
procedures in mind and may be at odds with the policies 
underlying the class action rules." Bruce A. Green, Conflicts 
of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 Fordham L. 
Rev. 71, 127 (1996). 
 
As the Second Circuit noted, in a case factually similar to 
Corn Derivatives: 
 
        Automatic application of the traditional principles 
       governing disqualification of attorneys on grounds of 
       conflict of interest would seemingly dictate that 
       whenever a rift arises in the class, with one branch 
       favoring a settlement or a course of action that another 
       branch resists, the attorney who has represented the 
       class should withdraw entirely and take no position. 
       Were he to take a position, either favoring or opposing 
       the proposed course of action, he would be opposing 
       the interests of some of his former clients in the very 
       matter in which he has represented them. 
 
        . . . . [W]hen an action has continued over the course 
       of many years, the prospect of having those most 
       familiar with its course and status be automatically 
       disqualified whenever class members have conflicting 
       interests would substantially diminish the efficacy of 
       class actions as a method of dispute resolution. 
 
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. , 800 F.2d 14, 18-19 
(2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). The court then concluded 
"that the traditional rules that have been developed in the 
course of attorneys' representation of the interests of clients 
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outside of the class action context should not be 
mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the 
settlement of class action litigation." Id.  at 19. Rather, it 
held, a balancing approach like that advocated by Judge 
Adams in Corn Derivatives was more appropriate in the 
class action context. 
 
The Agent Orange court listed a number of relevant 
factors in this balancing inquiry, including some from 
Judge Adams's opinion: the information in the attorney's 
possession, the availability of the information elsewhere, 
the importance of this information to the disputed issues, 
actual prejudice that could flow from the attorney's 
possession of the information, the costs to class members 
of obtaining new counsel and the ease with which they 
might do so, the complexity of the litigation, and the time 
needed for new counsel to familiarize himself with the case. 
See Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 19. 
 
We are persuaded by the well-reasoned opinions in Agent 
Orange and Corn Derivatives. We therefore hold that, in the 
class action context, once some class representatives object 
to a settlement negotiated on their behalf, class counsel 
may continue to represent the remaining class 
representatives and the class, as long as the interest of the 
class in continued representation by experienced counsel is 
not outweighed by the actual prejudice to the objectors of 
being opposed by their former counsel. In making this 
determination, the district court may consider the factors 
discussed in Agent Orange and in both the majority and 
concurring opinions in Corn Derivatives. 
 
Turning to the present case, we note that the situation 
here differs from that in Corn Derivatives in that counsel 
there sought to represent only one party, an objector, and 
not the remaining class members. In a case such as the 
present one, the balance weighs heavily in favor of denying 
a motion for disqualification of class counsel that is made 
on the basis of nothing more than the fact that the 
objectors include former clients (in the same case) of class 
counsel, without any showing of impropriety or prejudice. 
See also Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co. , 861 F.2d 
159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Recognizing that strict 
application of rules on attorney conduct that were designed 
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with simpler litigation in mind might make the class-action 
device unworkable in many cases, the courts insist that a 
serious conflict be shown before they will take remedial or 
disciplinary action."); cf. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 
900 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that plaintiff's counsel in a 
derivative action "remains bound . . ., if the client has 
objected [to a settlement], to inform the court of this when 
presenting the settlement, so that it may devise procedures 
whereby the plaintiff, with a new attorney, may himself 
conduct further inquiry if so advised"). 
 
Objectors contend that Class Counsel in this case did not 
adequately represent all of the class members because they 
failed to consider the unique interests and damages of the 
producer plaintiffs.13 Given our agreement with the District 
Court that the objectors' distinction between producer and 
investor plaintiffs is not supported by the record in this 
case, we find no clear error in the District Court's finding 
that Class Counsel adequately represented the interests of 
all class members, even if some class members and some of 
the class representatives are unsatisfied with the results of 
Class Counsel's efforts. See Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Class counsel's 
duty to the class as a whole frequently diverges from the 
opinion of either the named plaintiff or other objectors.").14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We also note that the objectors' brief discusses not the ethical 
problems involved in the events that transpired, but the alleged 
shortcomings of Class Counsel while they represented the objectors. See 
Appellants' Br. at 38-41. Their claims sound less like an ethical breach 
requiring disqualification than like a hint of possible malpractice. See 
also id. at 42-45 (blaming Class Counsel for objectors' failure to raise 
their damages theory until late in the litigation and labeling this "an 
actionable breach of the professional standard of care under extant 
Pennsylvania law"). 
 
14. See also Laskey v. International Union, UAW, 638 F.2d 954, 957 (6th 
Cir. 1981) ("That the class counsel proposed a settlement which the 
named representatives opposed does not prove that the interests of the 
class were not protected."); Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 
F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981) ("Because the`client' in a class action 
consists of numerous unnamed class members as well as the class 
representatives, and because `[t]he class itself often speaks in several 
voices . . ., it may be impossible for the class attorney to do more than 
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Applying the standard we have outlined above, we are 
satisfied that the District Court weighed the competing 
interests appropriately and did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion for disqualification of Class Counsel. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's order 
approving of the settlement in this class action and denying 
objectors' motions for subclass certification and 
disqualification of Class Counsel will be affirmed. 
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act in what he believes to be the best interests of the class as a whole 
. . . .' " (citation omitted) (alteration and omissions in original)); 
Maywalt 
v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 155 F.R.D. 494, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
("In the absence of concretely alleged acts of impropriety by the duly 
certified Class Counsel, or a showing abridgment of a significant 
minority of the Class' rights, this Court will not grant the hasty 
application of the Moving Representative Plaintiffs to replace Class 
Counsel on the eve of the Settlement Hearing."), aff'd, 67 F.3d 1072, 
1079 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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